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The Rights and Remedies of Abutting Owners on
Streets in The City of lTew York Over Which Elevated
Railroads Have Been Constructed Prior To 1890.
The enormous growth of large cities within the last
fifty years has given rise to a condition of affairs to
which economists and legislators have given i-ost earnest
thought "nd study.
The natural tendency of the suburban and fanning
classes in this, as in other countries, has been toward
the city. At first, when the population of the whole
country was small and the territory occupied by cities
correspondingly limited, this influx from Vfithout was
not felt; but, as populatinn increased and city areas
necessarily became greater, there :ias urgent need of
proper facilities for carrying over the wide areas, the
laboring, business and professional classes in the short-
est possible time. The lack of these facilities brought
a conjested condition in the cities, the aspect of which
-las alarming.
The laborin,- classes crodced into tenement houses
near the scene of their daily toil which soon became
breeding centers of disease and pestilence. The
great need was some method by which these classes could
have homes in the suburbs and neighboring towns, and
rapid communic~tinn with the heart of the city. In
other words, the problem was to allow the city to spread
out, but with such means of intercommunication between
the centers of trade and the outlying districts, that
the loss of time, ingoing to and from these points,
would be reduced to the minimum.
Horse railroads failed to bring about this result,
and these, soon followed by other surface roads, the mo-
tive power of which was supplied by electricity or by
cable, were scarcely more successful. The great ob-
jectinn to such surface roads being that in the thorough-
fares of a populous cit-, there could not be pemitted
that rate of tspeed in propelling the cars, which was
necessary to carry quickly, and conveniently, the im-
mense traffic which already more than overtaxed the ac-
commodations which these roads provided. The sub-ways
and elevated roads of London, seem to suggest the solu-
tion, and, in 1867, The West Side and Yonkers Patent
Railroad Company, incorporated under the General Rail-
road Act of 1850, was by Chapter 489 of the Laws of 1867,
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authorized to construct in New York City, an experimental
line of elevated railroad to extend from Battery Park,
a half mile northerly along Greenwich St., towards the
Harlem river.
This structure was to consist of a single track,
upon which, cars were to be run in contrary directions
upon opposites sides of the street, "which track shall
not exceed five feet in width between the center of the
rails, and shall be supported by a series of iron col-
umns, eighteen inches in diameter at the pavement, which
columns shall be placed at intervals of not less than
twenty feet along the curb-stone line, between the side-
walk and the carriare-way, and attached at their upper
extremities to The track aforesaid, so that the center
of the track shall be perpoondicular to t he center of the
columns, and, at a distance of not less Than fourteen
feet above the surface of the pavement"l. The cars were
,to be propelled by cables attached to statinnary en-
gines, which were to be concealed beyond or beneath the
surface of the street.
The further conditions binding the company were
that the experimental line was to be constructed within
one year, and, if approved by the Conmrissioners appointed
under the provisions of the Act, it should complete
its road to the Harlem river within five years. The
taking of any I-rivate pr'Terty, for the lurposes of such
road, was declured to be for public use, and the opera-
tion of such railway, was declared to be consistent with
the uses for which the municipal authorities held the
same.
By Laws of 1808, Chapter 8b, the company was given
six months additional time in which to complete the ex-
perimental road, and was authorized to experiment with
any other form of motive power, and adopt that form
which should be approved by the conmissioners. The
company was unable to go on and complete the road, and
was sold under foreclosure sale, with all its rights,
privileges and franchises, to the New York Elevated
Railroad Co., incorporated under the Act of 17-50 and the
supplementary and amendatory Acts thereto.
This failure tb comply with the conditions of its
charter, by the West Side and Yonkers Co., and thereby
to incur the forfeiture of all its rights, was not taken
advantage of by the Statewhichon the contrary, by Act
of 1875, Chapter 59, confirmed the New York R. R. Co.
"in the possessinn of the rights, privileges and fran-
chises" of the defunct West Sic.e and Yonkers Co., and
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authorized it to construct and complete one tract of the
experimental road, over the route designated for the
former road, and permitteCd it to use any form of motive
power, that the Commissioners, appointed under the
former Act of 1867, should approve.
The experimental line was duly completed, steam was
chosen as the motive power, the road was approved by
the Commissioners and extended over the route contem-
plated. In the same year the so-called Rapid Transit
Act was passed (Laws of 1875, Chapter 00) by virtue of
the provisions of which other elevated railroads were
built and operated. In the General Railroad Act of
1850, and the various Acts supplementary thereto, as
a-so in the Rapid Transit Act of 1875, provision had
been made for the condemning of lands, and interests
in lands, by proper proceedings in invitumn. These
provisions, at that time, however, were not supposed
to relate to any other estate than a corporeal one, and
no right in the streets was assumed to be in the abutt-
ing owners.
The rapid growth of the railroads, and the dsa:-age
to adjacent property thereby, received judicial notice
in the highest court, for the first time, "In The Matter
of The N. Y. El. R. R. CoV, 70 N. Y. 327. This company,
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taking advantage of the provisions of the Rapid Transit
Act, attempted to extend its route, but, not being able
to gain the consent of the property owners along the pro-
posed route of extension, under an order of the Supreme
Court, Commissioners were appointed who decided that the
road should be extended over one of the proposed routes.
An appeal from th.s order was taken to the Court of
Appeals upon various gro:nds, principal among which
were these; that the Rapid Transit Act, under which
Commissioners had been appointed, delegated legislative
powers to such Commissioners; that the Act was not a
General Law within Art. 3, ,-18 of the State Constitution;
that it was void as it granted exclusive privileges to
this company. These various grounds of appeal were
held untenable, as also, the -round of most importance
in this connection, "that the various Acts by virtue of
which the N. Y. El. R. R. Co. was incorporated, did not
provide for compensation being made to owners for pro-
perty taken".
Although at this time, elabor-te arguments we'e
submitted as to the rights of abutting owners in the
streets, the court declined to pass upon them, saying,
"This claim appears to rest upon the assumption, that the
abutting o'wners have property rights in the streets,
of which they are to be deprived, and for which they are
entitled to compensation under the Constitution. This
it will not be necessary to determine as provision is
made for compensation". The question of the rights of
an abutter on such streets was thus, for a time, left
an open one.
The streets and highways of a State, are necessarily
under its paramount control. The tenure by which the
State of New Y rk holds such lands, is based upon the
Act of 1779, by virtue of which, all the rights, title,
and interests, in the lands of the Colony of New York,
and any authority thereover, which was then vested in
the Kingdom of Groat Britain, was declared to have
vested in the State of ..ew York.
The supreme authority of the State, over the lgsids
within its jurisdiction, is consonant with the idea of
sovereignty. But, princip-es of dcmocratic government,
have limited this authority, when lands, or interests
therein, are taken, to a taking for public use; and,
by Art. 1, #6, of the State Constitution, private pro-
perty cannot be thus taken without just compensation to
the o'wner zhercof. This authority to take private pro-
perty for p blic use, upon just cornensation made, may
be delegated by the State, and this delegation is most
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frequently seen in the authority given municipalities,
in their charters or by statute, to open streets and
highways. Furthermore, this power may be delegated to
private persons, to be exercised under the same restric-
tions as are imposed upon he State. This authority
being in the State, the Legislature may direct, that
the title which may be acquired, in streets, opened under
condenmation proceedings, shall be in fee; or, that
nothing more than a mere easement, or riht-of-way, for
ordinary purposes shall be acquired.
This, then, is the situation in the cities of this
State. In some, the abutter owns in fee to the center
of the street, and the city, in such cases, has but a
mere easement in the street. In others, the fee of
the street, is in the m-micipkl authorities, but in
trust, that the same shall be kept open for street pur-
poses.
This is the case in the City of Fiew York, whose
title to the streets in fee, dates back to the Dongan
Charter, granted in 1886, by virtue of which, title to
the then streets, was vested in the municipality,
"For the public use and service, of the 1Mayor, Aldeynan
and Commonalty, of the said city, and of the inhabitants
of Manhattan's Island, and travelers therein". After
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the Var of the Revolution, and the Act of' 1779, before
referred to, the State, in 1796, relevised to the muni-
cipality, all its interests in the streets of the city,
and vested in it title thereto.
By the Act of 1813, (2 R.L. 10 ) the State delegated
to the City of New York, the power to open new streets
by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and vest-
ed the title to streets so oierQd and those thereafter
to be oi-ened, in the said City; in trust, however, that
the same should be kept open as public streets, "in like
manner as the other streets of the said City, are, and
of right, ought to bell. It is, therefore, by virtue
of these Lavs, thaL the title to the streets of the said
city, is vested in fee in the municipal authorities, but
in trust, that they shall be kept open and free for pub-
lic uses.
Public Uses.
In connection with a discussion of what are public
uses, attention must be given to the nature and effect
of the structures '3hich have been erected by the Elevated
Railroad Companies of New York, prior to the year 1890.
The experimental road, as described supra, was but a
precursor of what was to come. The general plan of
the roads as now built is as follows. Upon upright
columns, placed at regular intervals on both sides of
the street, and slightly witkin the curbstone line, are
supported transverse girders, which extend entirely a-
cross the street. Upon these, lateral girders are
laid, which, in turn, support the tracks upon which cars
are propelled by steam power, at a high rate of speed,
and at short intervals. The superstructure, extending
across the whole traveled track of the street, at about
ten feet from tlhe houses adjoining, hinders, necessarily,
the free passage of light and air to such premises.
The trains, passing rapidlyand frequently, give a flick-
ering character to the light admitted to those parts
of the houses on a line with the cars, and the smoke,
gas and steam, also abridge the free passage of light
and air; while the drippings of oil and water and the
frequent columns, to some extent obstruct access to the
promises adjoining.
What, then,is the position in which-such a structure
stands to the public uses for which the City's streets
are held. When, as in the first class of tenures cited,
the fee of the street is in the abutting owner, and
the City has but a mere easement in such street, the
question is not a difficult one. It was early settled
in such cases, that the use of such a street was to be
restricted to a general right of passage in the public.
Such as would be usual in an ordinary street; as, the
passage of pedestrians and ordinary vehicles. But no-
new, or additional burden, could be imposed upon the
abutting o-;mer.
On this theory a surface railroad acting under muni-
cipal authority, which had laid its tracks over such
streets, without having condemned the owner's interest
therein, was held a trespasser; and that an injunction
would lie against it prohibiting the maintenance of it
as a nuisance. Craig v. Rochester City and Brighton
R.R. Co., 39 ll.y. 407. The construction of such a road
and its operation, being held to impose an additional
burden upon the abutter, a fortiori, if the use is one
like that of the Elevated Railroadswhich is much more
inconsistent with the ordinary uses to which s uch a
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street might lawfiully be put, would it be an invasion
of the rights of the abuting owner. So, where an
Elevated Railroad is constructed over streets, the fee
of which is in the abutting owners, such railroad coin-
pany commits a trespass, as against such abutting owners,
and an action for damages, or for an injunction, will
lie accordingly.
But a much more difficult question is presented,
when ,tie city, as in New York, ovns the fee of the
streets, though in trust for street purposes. The
question of what are, and what are not, street purposes
consistent , Tithin this trust, is a very nice one. There
is no doubt that where the city has a mere easement in
the street, that, accordin', to the well settled princi-
ples governing such an interest, no new! burden can be
imposed upon the servient tenement, without a condemna-
tion of the owner's interest for the further uses de-
sired. But here, we have a different situation, not
an easement in the city merely, but a fee, and the only
limitation upon the exercise of the authority so acquirei
"that the streets so held shall be maintained as free
and open streets as the other sty'eets of' the city ar ,
and af right, ought to be". It is very evident, thet
the determination of ,,hat are such uses of the street,
as will be permitted by the terms of this trust, lies
within the discretion of the courts. They may deter-
mine that a use is inconsistent, even though the Legis-
lature in the statute authorizing this use, has declared
it to be a public one consistent with the trust.
Advances in civilization, in ealth and rrosperity,
must, and have, influenced the courts in this determina-
tion. This idea was boldly maintained, in one of
the early surface railrood cases, where one of the
jud-es, in discussing what were public uses, in sub-
stance said; that it was impossible to limit within
any definition what were public uses; Lhat they must
change as circumstances changed; and, that ahi-idred
years from t.hai time, there would, no doubt, be uses
permitted by the courts, of which they, then, could
know nothing. Anc. so, in confirmation of this theory,
courts have upheld the laying of. sewers, gas and water
mains; so lamp-posts and telegraph-poles along the
street, have bten held no infringement of the rights of
abutting owners. The te-mporary obstr-:ction of streets
for the purpose of repairing them, though it obstructs.
access to the premises adjoining, is readily seen to
conform to the public use, in that the obstruction is
but temporar, to the end that the public may have safer
ways .
The laying of surf _,ce railroad tracks, and the
maintenance of such roads, early met with great opposi-
tion. It was claimed that not only :,ere they a
source of .reat discomfort and damage, but That they
took the rights wlhich the abutters had in the adjacent
streets, their easement of access; and they cid not
constitute a public use within the trust. This trust,
however, is a public one, held not alone for the people
of the City of 17ew York, but for the inhabitants of
the whole state; and, such being the case, the Legis-
lature may authorize the construction and maintenance
of such railroads, for in the construction or operation
of such railroads, no right,either of the abutter, or
the rublic, has been unlawfully taken. Though conse-
quentially, the abutter may be damaged, the street is
still an open one, and it has not lost its open and
public character, by reason of the fact that vehicles
of a cifferent character, than Uhose orc inarily used,
are allowed to traverse the streets upon fixed tracks,
which conform to the general course of the street. As
quoted in Story v. N.Y. El. R.R. Co. 90 N.Y. 122, there
is still "a way between two houses - a street", an the
operation of a street surface railmad has been declared
to be consistent with the public uses of a street.
These, then, are some of t]ie principal uses to which
a street, held under such a tenure, may be put, and
these uses have been maintained by the courts, from time
to time.
Is an Elevated Rilroad construct cc and operated
over the streets of the City of New York, such a public
use -as is consistent with the trust upon which title
to them is held?
In the original statute, authorizing the building of
the experimental road, Laws of 1867, Chapter 489, such
experimental railway in the streets was declarecd to be
a public use, consistent wit!i the uses for which the
Mayor held -he same. In People v. Kerr, 27 4.Y. 188,
the court held that the trust, upon which the municipal
authorities, under the Act of 18!$, held the streets
in New York City, was publici juris, and the power
of regulating and governing such uses was vested in the
Legislature as representative of the whole people.
Following out the logic of thjs case to its natural con-
clusion, it would seem that the declaration by the Legis-
lature that this was a public use, would have been
sufficient, but, what was said in People v. Kerr, is
evidently to be confined to the facts as they existed
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in that case, and the subsequent ruilings of the Court
of Appeals, go to show that the inherent power of de-
termining what is a public use in such streets is vested
in the courts. In the light of these decisions, the
answer to the question must be in the negative.
The construction and maintenanee of an Elevated Rail-
road is not a public use within the terms of the trust,
and, as we have shown it to a greater o- less extent,
hinders and impedes the passage of light and air, and
obstructs access to abutting premises, it is a taking
of property within the meaning of Art. 1, #6, of the
State Constitution, and cannot be justified without duo
compensation bein- made to the abutting owners, whose
property is so taken.
These conclusions are based upon the reasoning and
legal principles applied in four celebrated cases, in
which the rights of the abutting oiiners upon streets in
which Elevated Railroads were constructed, were thoroughlf
adjudicated. The reasoning by which such a use by
the railroad comrany is determined to be a use incon-
sistent with the lublic uses of the streets of New York,
anL the development of that reasoning, by virtue of
which such an entry upon the streets was declared a
taking of Irolerty within the provisions of the Consti-
tution will be next considered.
The maintenance of a street must, of necessity, so
far as the abitters thereon are concerned, be for
three principal reasons:
1st. That through and (wer the streets thern_ shall
be free passage of light. -o the abutting premises.
2nd. That such premises shall receive an unhind-
ered and unpolluted supply of air.
3rd. That access to them shall be unobstructed.
If the street be closed in such a manner, as to materi-
ally impede the passage of light and air, and obstruct
access to the adjacent Iroperty, such property, of
necessity, will be rendered less valuable according to
the degree of the impairment of these natural concomi-
tants to the benificial enjoyment of such property.
Though as has been V'rOquently declared, the English
doctrine of ancient lights and prospect, constituted no
part of the law of the Colonies, and is not recognized
in this State, yet, there has al;.ays been recognized
in this co ntry, an easement of' light, air and access,
which, in proper cases, has been enforced by the State
courts. And this is true whether the easement has been
created by express grant,or-by dedication implying such
a grant. In Myers v. Gemmell, 10 Barb. 543, it was said
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that, in a case ,here a building occulied four sides of
a lot, with a central court through which light and air
were furnishe6 to the tenanbs of such building, the
owner may be ,.ell p'crsumed -o have oLedicated the olen
space for the benefit of' all the tenants. Ara in 64
1..Y. 432 a lessee of a store which store received light
ana air from a yard adjoining was held to have an ease-
ment in such yard; that such easement went as an
appurtenance to the p roperty, anc the lessee when leasing
the I roperty from the owner of the yard and store,
relied upon the yard remaining open for the prpose of
ftrnishing light and air to his premises. On this
ground, though the lessee had leased the store only, a
subsequent purchaser of the land constituting the yardq
from the lessor, was restrained from building thereon,
and from thus destroying the e-sement of the lessee.
The principles governing the decisions in these
cases, were recognized when the first Elevated Railroad
case, involving the rights of abutters, came before the
Court of Appeals. That case, Story v. The F.Y. El. R.
R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122, directly raised -he question whether
the r-ilroad, as maintained and cperated by the defendan-,
was a use consisten- xvith the public uses for which the
city streets were held. Story, the plaintiff, was
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vested with title to premises on Front St. in New York
City, over which the I.Y. El. R.R. Co., proposed to
operate ai Elevated Railroad. His title to the pre-
mises in question came through various mesne monveyances
from -he original owner who had boight the lands from th .
city. Previous to such sale the lands, which were undor
water, had been surveyed and laid out on a map as abutt-
ing on certain streets therein designated. A covenant
in the grantee's deed required him to erect and construct
the saic streets and f rther c(eclared that said streets
"shall forever thereafter continue and be for the free
and common passage, and as public streets and ways, for
the inhabitants, and all others, in like manner -s the
other streets of the said city, are, and of right, ought
to be". The grantee constructed the streets, and, as
before stated, the plaintiff having come into possession
of a part of a premises so conveyed, abutting upon one
of the streets so constructed, brought suit against the
defendant to restrain him from constructinog and operatini
the proposed Elevated Railroad.
A questi,Jn was here raised as to whether or not the
plaintiff ovwned the fee of the street, under the con-
veyance made to his grantor, but, in deciding the case,
it was held immaterial to the decision whether the fee
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were in the city or in the abutting owner. In either
case Lhe conveyance to bhe original grantee of the pre-
mises was a dedication to him of the right to have the
street maintained as an o1ien and unobstructed way for
the benefit of his adjoinini; premises. As to the
nature of these rights it was said, "Gencrally it may be
said it is to have the street kept open so that from it
access may be had to the lot, -nd light and air furnished
across the open way. The street occupies the surface,
and to its uses the rights of the adjacent ovners are
subordinate but above the surface there can be no un-
lawful obstruction to the access of light and air to
the dltrimont of abutting owners. To hold otherwise
would be to allow the city to lerogate from its orn
grant, an( violate the arrangement, on the faith of which
the lot was purchased. This, in effect, was an agree-
ment that, if the grantee would buy the lot, he might
have the use of the light and air over the open space cde-
signated as a street".
It was further held tha. such easements in the
street being in the abutter, in taking them by the erect-
ion of its road, the defendant would take plaintiff's
property as much as if he took the tenement itself.
And this upon the authority of Arnbld v. Hudson R.R. Co.
55 N.Y. 661. Here Arnold, the plaintiff, was the oimer
of a mill, and also, of the right to takC water from
a pond at a dis;ence from his lands under an agreement
so to do, the water was conveyed by means oi a trunk,
over the lands of one Innes, to the mill. The rail-
road company having acquired part of Innes' lands, for
the parpose of constructing its railroaa, without the
consent of the plaintiff, removed the trunk and placed
it under 7rouna, laying the track over it, by reason of
which change rhe water power of the plaintiff was
materially impaired to his damage. It was held that
the taking of the plaintiff's easement was a taking of
property within the Constitutional prohibition.
Proceeding upon the analogy of this case, the court
said, "We jhave indeed a aifferent element anm a different
medium, by which the right of use was made available,
but the principle is the same. Whether light crosses
the open space unrestrained, or water is conveyed by
mechanical contrivance over it, can make no difference.
The right of'unobstructed p~ssage is alone in question
in each case".
The t(ecision in the S-ory case did not, however,
settle discussion upon ,his much mobted subject. Al-
though it held that an easement was in the abutting owner
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it was maintained that This decision should be ±imited
to -he facts of that case. But this position was plain-
ly untenable, and, in the Lahr case, 104 :;.Y. 268, which
followed, the court affirmed the decision in the Story
case, and decideCd, that .wihere the street had been opened
lnder -roceedings in invitum, the trust relation which
the city assumed to the adjacent property owners under
the Act of 1816, was not different from -hat assumed by
it in the ceed by w.hich Story claimed title to his
premises. Further, that even thoggh no land of the
abutting owner had be-en taken for the bex. o the street,
as he was a party to the proceedings, anc- liable to be
assessed for the benefits accraing to his property by
reason of the orening of Lhe str'eet, such benefit could
not be taken from him withiout compensation.
These benefits are taken into consideration by the Com-
missioners in estimating the am.o-nt to be assessed upon
the abutting owners, in raisinr- the fu)ncs necessary to
open the street. Axd where the abutter is so assessed,
as a compensation for the additional benefits stcured
to him *if in the next instamt , they may be legislated
away anQc. iverted to inconsistent uses, a system has
been inaugurated which resembles more nearly legalized
robbery than any form of acquiring property".
Two other important cases, the Abondrath case,
12 N.Y. 11, which was decidled in thu 2nd Division,
and the Kane c~se, 12 .Y. 164, decided in the 1st Pi-
vision of the Court of Appeals, effectually put at rest
all questions as uo whether an abuttin{g owner in streets
in New York City has property :-ights in such streets.
In both these cases, 1.:hich went up upon substantially
similar facts, an interesting questinn was raised, ":s
to whether the Civil Law was brought over to this country
by the Dutch, in whose regime, Pearl St. in New York
City was laid o t. By the Civil Law no easement
whatever was recognized in the abutting owners on
streets, but an absolute fee was in the government, so
that a street might be entirely closed w ithout compen-
sation being made to adjacent owners. The plaintiffs,
Abendrath and Kane, owned property on Pearl St. extending
to the street line only, and it ,;as claimed that since
Pearl St. was opened during! fle Dutch occupAtion of'l:!Rn-
hattan Island, the Civil jaw applied as against them,
however different the r-Lle might be as to the other
streets. This doctrine was not sustained. By the
Common Lawi an abutter's easement was recognized in
streets and highways and the court reftuded to go into
any historical discussion, however interesting, as it
held the rule toowell settled to be shaken. That
there existed an analogy between the principles govern-
ing the dedication of land for a street b-: a private pe±-
som, anu a dedication for the same purpose, by a municipg-
corporation. And, as the state, by statute, had deai-
cated the streets in the City of New York as and for
public streets, upon aeceptance of the dedication by
the abutting property ownmers, that dedication became
irrevocable.
By these decisions it has been settled that an
abutting owner upon streets in New York City whether
his title to the adjacent premises has been acquired by
grant from the city; or, the streets have been opened
under condemnation proceedings, and he has been, or is
liable to be accessed for the benefits thereby accruing
to This property; or, whero he owns lands abutting upon
aistreet,opened before the state government was estab-
lished, has easements in such streets of light, air and
access. That such easements constitute proper3y within
the meaning of Art. 1, #6, of the State Constitution,
and cannot be taken without just compensation to the
owner. That an Elevated Railroad xJ-hich impairs such
easements without the consent of the oiiner, takes the
property of the abutter unlawfully _nu he has a right of
action agaLnst such a company accordingly.
The Abutters' Remedies.
An easement of light, air and access, being in such
an abutting owner, the erection of an Elevated Railroad
upon such a street, although under Legislative hnd Muni-
cipal authority, is, as has been said before unlawful,
if compensation for the takimg of such easements is not
made to the oviner thereof. This being the case, the
maintenance of the railroad constitutes an invasion
upon the rights of the ovaner, in the nature of a tres-
pass and, as it is permanent in its char cter, a private
nuisance to the adjacent oiners. Uron this theory,
The abut, ter has a right of action at Law for injuries
sustained, and also, an action in Equity, to restrain
the maintenance of the nuisance. And first, as to the
action at Law.
Remedy at Law.
The structure being a trespass in its creation and
operation, the abutting owiner has a righft of action
each day accruing for the damafres which he sustains
thereby. Lahr v. .l. R.R. Co. and, as the structure
is not a lawful one, the owrner may recove- not only
damages to his e-sements of light, air and access,
but other and consequential injuries as damages sus-
tained by the noise, consequent i-on the running of
26
trains. His right to damages, and the amount thereof
is calculated from the institution of the nuisance to
the date of bringing the action. For all such time as
he has not recovered dama-es, he may have them by bringing
his action. But, in this action, he cannot recover
both past and future damages, on %he gro.ud that the
injury is permanent. His remedy in such a case is
in Equity. In the Lahr case, a different rule was
applied, but it was so applied, for the reason that
the parties had agreed in the trial court upon the meas-
ure of damages, and not because the apellate court in-
tended to lay down any such rule.
The rule waid cown in surface railroad c rses, as in the
Uline case, 101 N.Y. 98, is the proper one, in.deter-
mining the time for which damages may be obtained.
It is there held that the abutter, may obtain a judgment
for damages, only up to the time of the commencement of
the suit, and, if the nuisance is continued, that jucig-
ment is not a bar to subsequent suits by the party in-
jured. "For if this were allowed, the defendant, in
the first suit for damages, might bar the plaintiff
in any further action, and thus obtain the title to the
interest, which title, in Law, can only be secured by
proceeding-s in invitumV'
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This principle was affirmed in the case of Pond v.
El. R.R. Co., 112 N.Y. 188, where the plaintiff had
brought his action at Law for damages simply, claiming
prospective as well as past damages, on the ground that
the injury was permanent and irremediable.
Remedy in Equity.
B-t the suitor Lia "T choose to bring his action in
Equity, claiming that the trespass is permanent in its
nature and that action is brought to avoid a multiplicity
of suits. The mEj~oity of suits are so brought, the
complainant praying for relief by injunction, restraining
the oper tion or construction of the road, or, in the
alternative, both fee and rental damages for the taking
of his easemenLs. This conforms to the -encral rules
of Equity which permit a court exercising equity powers,
having once gained jurisdiction ove)r such a case for the
purpose of graxti an equitable remedy, to rive damages
also. The judgment, in such a case is that within a
specified time, an injunction shall issue against the
defendant unless he shall elect to pay the damages
which the abutter has sustained; and, if he elects so
to do, such damages shall not be paid, until the plain-
tiff shall execute a conveyance zo the defendant, of
all his rights to the esasements taken by the defenda~it,
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Thus the complainant seeking Equity is compelled "to do
Equity". The intention of the suitor in such a case,
is not that by the injunction which issues, t1E defend-
ant shall discontinue operatirg his road or cease from
buildirg the structure, qs it might seem theoretically.
In practice, the Elevate Railroad Company stilloperates
its road. Cars are regularly run arn no thought is
ebtertained by the parties that any other effect shall
be given to the judgement. In reality, therfore,
this action in Equity partakes of the nature of proceed-
ings to condemn the abutter's property rights in the
street, and this was in fact held in American Bank Uote
Company v. N.Y. El. R.R. Co., 29 hl. E. Rep. 302, where
Finch J. said, "There is no doubt in this case, 2nd I
think in any case, that the injunstion of a court of
Equity and its alternative damages, are to be deemed a
substitute for the ordinary proccedings for condemnation,
with the practical difference, only, that in the one
case, the company is the moving party, and in the other,
the owner".
Before leaving this examination of the Equity Juris-
diction, brief notice must be -iven to a question,
which, though it be of procedure merely, and, ther.fore, fo
ci-n to) so limited a discussion as can be given in.
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this Thesis, is yet of great importance; since, though
this construction is given to the j'idgment of a Court of
Equity in these cases, the equitable theory of the
action and judgment, is still maintained. An atUempt
was made in the case of Lynch v. Met. El. R.R. Co.,
29 N. E • 315, under Section 970 of the Cbde of Civil
Procedure, to obtain a framing of issues as to past dama-
ges to be tried by a jury, in Equity suits brought by the
abutter. But it was there held that the defendant
had no constitutional right to a jury tri&l, as was
claimed, under Art. 1, #2 of the State Constitution.
That, though the claim for past damages could have been
adjudicated at Law, the plaintiff had not brought his
suit in that jurisdiction, but his cause of action was
-he restraining "of the continuance of Acts which were
constantly injuring him, and would to all appearances,
constantly in the future continue to injure him".
That was a form of relief demandable and cognizable,
only, on the Equity side of the court. The Court of
Equity having gained jurisdiction over the cause special-
ly, could retain it for general purToses, and decree
past danages. And that such a jurisdiction, without
jury trial, had been exercised before the clause in the
Constitution had been enacted, and was, therefore, no
violation of the Constitutional guaranty.
The decision in this case led to an amendment of
that section, Laws of 1891, Chapter 20', by which, in an
action controlled by that provision, where one or more
questions arose on the plesdinrs as to the value of'
property, or as to the damages to wihich a party might be
entitleL, ulon notice, such party might apply to the
court for an order, directing the framing and submission
of such issues to a jury, whose findings should be
conclusive in the action, unless the verdict was set
asid9 or a new ;rial ordered. Undei- the amended sec-
tion, it was again attempted in Shepard v. Man. El. R.R.
Co., 30 N.E. Rep. !87, to secure a jury trial as to
past damages, But the court reaffirmed the doctrine
of Lynch v. Met. El. R.R. Co., and held it no error
on the part of the trial court in refusing to grant
such an order. That the soction could not govern suVch
an Equity case and, that the gr,?nting of such an order,
rested in the sole discretion of the court sitting in
Equity. This amendment was subsequently repealed by
the Legislature in the session of 1892.
The Measure of Damages.
The effect of the judgment both at Law and in
Equity, being compensation in damages for the taking of
the plaintiff's easements; what is the measure of
damages by which this compensation ma', be ascertained?
The easement taken is an incorporeal heridatament, ap-
purtenant to the estate of the owner, a right to light,
air and access. Its value cannot be ascertained, as
could the value of the tenement itself to which it is
apputtemant, by the market value of the property taken.
Light, air and access, in themselves have no definite
value, and the injury done to the abutter, in impair-
ing these easements, can only be ascertained by a re-
ference to the effect of this injury upon the property
to which the easements are appurtenant. An estimate
of the loss, either total or partial, of the beneficial
enjoyments of these rights can only b e made by an in-
quiry as to the value of the premises before the ease-
ments were impaired, and th-ir decrease in value since
the taking. 3ohm v. Met. El. R.R. Co., 29 N. E. Rep.
802. iNeyman v. Met. El. R.R. Co., 118 17.Y. 618.
The measure of damages is the value of the property
without the railroad and with it.
If the property has suffered a loss of value by reason
of the construction of the railroacL, then the abutter
is damaged. If he has suffered no damage, as measured
by this stanc.rd, then he is entitled to mere nominal
damages for the u lawful takin7 of his easement.
Although the Acts, under which these companies came
into existence, provided, that in determining the compen-
sation to be made to owners whose property should be
taken, no allowance or deduction should be made on
acco .nt of any realor supposed, benefit which the party
in interest might derive from the proposed railroad,
these benefits may be taken into consideration, in de-
termining the damages which an abutter has sustained
by the taking of his easement. Newman v. Met. El.
R.R. Co., This is true though the benefits be special
to the abutting owner, or shared in by all the owners
on the street. This is so held, on the ground, that
these provisions in the statutes regu:ating the com-
pensation to be paid to owners whose property should be
taken, were intended to relate only to the taking of land,
which must be paid for at its full market value. That,
though recognized as a species of property, by judicial
decision, the easements acquired value in Law only as
they benefited -he abutting property, and not as
property valuable in themselves. So the taking of such
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easements is a consequential injury to the premises to
which they are appurtenant and as such, and in estimat-
ing the extent of such injury, proof of benefits accru-
ing to the owuners byT the construction of the road can bc
taken. In the Ilevwman case it was held that where the
rental value of a part of plaintiff's premises was dim-
inished by the construction of the rilroad, and, on
the otherhand, the first floor, used as a store, was
increased in value, by the business brought it from the
establishing of a -station at that point, such increase
in value might be set off against a damage to the
other parts of the premises. And, in the Bohm case,
the general rise in the value of property consequent
upon the erection of the company's road, which was es-
tablished by uncontradicted evidence, was held a good
ground for 7 roving that the plaintiff had not been
injured. So on proof that the Elevated Railroad had
impaired to a certain extent the e2sements of the abutter
by reason of which the value of his property was dimin-
ished, but, it being shoym that the premises had been
reduced in value from the movement of business up town,
and away from that street, it was held that both these
facts might be taken into consideration in determining
the damage inflicted by the r ilroad company.
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That from the 7eneral loss occasioned by the movement
up towm, should be taken the loss chargeable to the
company, and for that loss the company was liable..
This ruling, which would seem to involve the courts
in a calculation based merely upon opinion, was upheld
on the ground that the defendant at Law, was a wrong-
doer, and as such, had no standing in coi.-et to interpose
the defense that damages, under such a ruling, "could
not be ascertained with definiteness and precision".
Drcker v. Man. El. R.R. Co., 106 N. Y. 156.
Again quoting from Bohm v. Met. El. R.R. Co., "The
question is, what in fact has been the actual result upon
the land remaining? Has its actual market value been
decreased by the taking, or has the taking prevented an
advancement in value greater than has actually occurred;
and, if so, to what extent? The amount of such decrease
4l the value of the remaining 1ind, or the amount of the
difference between its actual marXet value and what it
might have been worth if the railroad company had not
taken the other property, is the amount of damage which
the defencdanT, should pay. If, on the contrary, there
has been neither dectease in the market value caused
by the railoaCL. nor any preventinn of increase by the
same cause, how can it be truly said that the lot ovyner
has been injured to the extent of' a farthing? The
absence of injury may have been the result of the gen-
eral growth of the city, by reason of which -he particu-
lae property has grown in v-lue with the rest of the
city. It is the fact, not the cause, which is material.
Where it appears that the I.roperty left has actually
advanced in value, unless it can be shown, but for -he
act of the defend-nt in taking these easements, it
would have groirm still more in value, the fact is plain
.:bat it has not been damaged".
Rule at Law.
In considering this questic>n of the measre of
damages, a distinction is to be made beticon the rules
applying at Law a-nc. in Equity, where aomages are claimed
for incidental injuries not impairing the abuttor''
easements. In an action at Law, the abutter may re-
cover damages for any injury to his easements of light,
air and access. So the smoke, gases and cinders,
from the locomotives by which the cars are propelled,
have been held to impair his easement of air; the
structure and Uhe cars running at short intervals, his
easement of light; and the wa~er and oil and, "possibly
the frequent columns, his right of access". Prucker v.
1ian. El. R.R. Co. But further, in such an action for
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past damages the abutter may recover for any consequent-
ial injuries caused by the maintenance of the rail-
road; for the company's entry upon the street and its
taking of the abutte"'s easements, was a wrongful aet,
a trespass. This is a principle well settled, and one
applied in the surface railroad cases, :en such a
trespass has been comnmitted. Therefore, as has bi-on
before stated, Lhe abutter may recover for inj'ries
his property sustains from the noise of passing trains.
Kane v. El. R.R. Co., 125 N.Y. 164.
Rule in Equity.
But in Equity the rule is not the same. The
theory that the judgment in Equity that an injunction
-shall issue or alternative damages be paid, is in the
nature of and a substitute for, proceedings in invitum,
is here further elaborated. Equity follo-.s the Law,
since reference must be made to the legal practice in
condemning lands. In such proceedings consequential
injuries are not allowed to affect the amount of damages
to be paid for the lsn& taken. These easements of
light, air and access, which have been declared property
by the Story case, would, in the case of an ordinary
surface railroad, have been mere incidents to the Iroperty
of the abutter, and any lessening of his enjoyment of the
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same, would have been a consequential injury for which
no compensation could have been claimed, but the Story
case makes these privileges, when existing above the
surface of the streets, property rights, and, therefore,
any injury to them, as such, is a taking of private pro-
perty within the meaning of the Constitutional prohi-
bition. However, these, and these only, were declared
to be pmpur(y ri!;hbts in that case, and many other in-
cidents rc,.ain which might be injured by the Elevated
Railroads. As to such, the rules of Law must apply,
and for injuries to such incidental benefits, no damages
may be recovered in Equity.
It is only then, for injuries which impair these, his
judicially declared property rights, that the abutter
may recover damages in Equity. American Bank Note
Company v. N. Y. El. R.R. Co.
Some interesting and important decisions, relating
to testimony admissable, in determining the damage which
an abutter haa received, have been recently decided by
the Court of Appeals. But, as they relate more part-
icularly to a discussion of evidence receivable, they
can receive but brief discu ssion here. The measure
of darfages remains the same, though .Ihe manner of as-
ceCtaining that damage, by the testimony given at the
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trial, has received careful limitation. These decisions
have, in the main, been upon the admission of expert
testimony, and decide that such testimony is admissable
to determine the present worth of the premises damarecd,
both as to t'leirc fee and rental value, and also, as to
their value before the appurtenant easements vere taken
by the railroad. But testimony which permits the ex-
pert to usurp the functions of the court or jury, as,
where the expert testifies that, in his judgment, the
property has, or has not been damaged by the mainte-
nance of the railroad, is not admissable, and is a good
ground for reversing a judgment. As said before, the
expert, in such a case, undertakes to do what the court
or jury are to do, viz: to decide whether the abutter's
premises have been injured by the trespass of the rail-
road, and, if so, what are the damages to which he is
entitled. Roberts v. N. Y. El. R.R. Co., 28 N. E. Rep.
486.
Who Are Abutting Owners.
Having considered the easements which may be in-
jured by the operation of Elevated Railroads, and the
remedies which the abutter may have foi? the injury to
these easements; who are the abutting owners entitled
to exercise these remedies?
The use of the tern trespass, in describing the
entry of the railroad company, is apt to be misleading,
in that a trespass, as known at the common law, would
be presumed to be intended. This, technically, is
not the case and the term is used rather to denote an
invasion of the rights of the abutter. In this view
of the case, one who owns in fee, the premises abutting
on a street occupied by an Elevated Railroad, is an
abutting owner with all the rights which have been enum-
erated in this discussion, even though, after the con-
struction of the railroad, such owner has le'sed his
premises to another. Kernochan v. N. Y. El. R.R. Co.
128 N. Y. 359 For the road, having been constracted
before this lease was made, the premises had been de-
prived of these appurtenant easements, and went into
the hands of the lessee in such impaired condition and
the rent agreed upon between the parties must, of neces-
sity have been fixed with refercnce to the then condition
of the property. The owner has not, by the lease
transferred his right of action, which is each.,day accrm-
ing. The injury, for that reason, is not to the lesse,
who took possession with knowledge of the depreciated
value of the property, but to the freehold, the fee,
as held by the lessor, and he may have his remedy at
Law, or in Equity.
If, however, the owner had demised the I -emises,
previous 7o the entry of the railroad, though not direct-
ly adjudicated, it wo-.ld seem to follow logically, that
the owner would have no action for' damages accruing dur-
ing the continuance of the tenancy, for the Iessee took
the property with its easements unimpaired and such
entry has been a direct damage to his interest therein.
The executor or trustee of a decedcnt abutting
owner, is inv-sted with such decedent's rights of action
for damages accruing, up to the time of such decedent's
death and they may bring such suits for the benefit
of the beneficiaries. Put the heirs or devisees,
upton title vested in them may sue for all injuries
to the easements of their estate so vesting, fron the
time of the death of the decedent. 14 N.Y. Supp. 952.
An abutter who has purchased premises from another
during whose holding the railroad made its entry, takes
all the rights of action which his grantor had at the
time of the sale, even though he purchases at a de-
preciated value, consequent upon the taking of the ap-
purtenant easements by the railroad company. As the
grantor has parted with all his interest in the land,
he has nothing upon which to sustain a claim for the
depreciated market value of the premises, at the time
of sale. And, as on the other hand, the grantee took
the premises with all the easements appurtenant to them,
he received the absolute right to enjoy light, air and
access impaired. Though they had been impaired
by the operation of the railroad during the holding of
his grantor, such a taking was a wrong for which the
grantor might have ha& redress each day of its contin-
uance. However, though this wrong was continuous in
its nature, in the eyes of the Law it is not considered
a permanent one, as between grantor and grantee, and the
grantor, in conveyin- the premises, could not reserve
either the rights of action or the easements. Pappen-
heim v. Met. El. R. R. Co., 128 N. Y.
It has been further he3 d that under Section 1065,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue of which,
"a person seized of an estate in remainder, or rever-
sion, may maintain an action, founded upon -n injury Cone
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to the inheritance, notwithstanding an intervening estate
for life, or for years", that,, as the taking of the
appurtenant easements, is an injury to the inheritance,
the remainderman or reversioner might have his action for
such a taking -d injury;. 8 N. Y. Supp. 536.
Limitations Upon Abutters' Actions.
As has been frequently said, the injury to the
abutter is a continuous one for which damages are accru-
ing daily. Yhat, if any, are the limitations upon the
bringing of his action?
The first bar to an action would be where, by his
laches, the railroad company has gained title to his
easements by presciption, and this title as decided
in the American B-nk Note Company case, cited supra,
can be obtained by the company. To gain such a title,
the possession of the easements must have been contin-
uous and adverse to the abutter's title for a period
of twenty years. The use m st be the same during that
period. A use for one purpose being maintained by the
company for a less period, and upon that a use of another
and different character for the remainder of the time,
will not be such a consecutive and continuous use as
will pass the title as against the abutter.
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In American Bank Note Company v. El. R.R. Co. where the
first use was that maintained for a few years by the
'West Sideand Yonkers Co. in the experimental road which
it built, the defendant, attempted to maintain that this,
with the different burden imposed upon the plaintiff's
property, when the N. Y. El. R.R. Co. enlarged and re-
built the structure and uised a different motive power,
could be combined to make up the full term of adverse
possession, This claim, however, was not sustained.
But, if the possession of the railroad company
has not ripened into title, as long as the trespass is
continued, and the ownership of the premises is in the
abutter, he has a right of action. At Law, an action
for trespass upon real.property, no; brought within six
years after its commission, and where such trespass
has been a temporary and non-continuous one, would have
been barred by the abutter's fail-gre to bring the suit
within the period limited. The legal remedy being
lost, there would be no ground for maintaining a suit
in Equity, for the jurisdiction of Equity, in such cases,
is based iApon the necessity of preventing a multipli-
city of suits, and the fact that the legal remedy is
inadequate. But the trespass being a continuous
one and each day a new cause of action arising, in Law
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the abutter may elect to bring an action daily for such
trespasses, or to wait until enough damages have accrued
for such causes of action as have not outlawed, and
unite all in one suit.
This, the continuous nature of the trespass, and
the inconvenience and delay, consequent upon a multi-
ilicity of suits, which will be caused the abutter in
obtaining comlensation for his injuries at Law, is
the ground upon which courts of Equity, in Elevated
Railroad suits take possession of the subject matter,
and award full and adequate relief. In Galway v. !et.
El. R.R. Co., 28 N.- E. Rep. 480, this conclusion was
reached, and it was held that Section 388 of the Code of
Civil Procedure providing that lactions, the limitation
of which is not therein specially prescribed, must be
cormmenced within ten years" did not apply to Equity
actions, brought to restrain the commission of tres-
passes by Elevated Railroads upon the property rights
of abutting owners.
In concluding this discussion, in ,Vhich it is
hoped that the salient features of the rights and re-
medies of the abutting owners, have received the caf'e-
ful consideration they deserve, the position which the
Court of Appeals has taken in determining those rights,
is of considerable interest, as bearigg upon the probable
outcome of future litigation.
The Story case, the first in which the abutters'
rights were adjudicated, was decided by a divided
court, and the present Chief Justice, wrote a masterly
dissenting opinion. But the court was of necessity,
controllo, ,thereafter, by the principles applied in that
case, and, the natur-l outcome was the decisions in
the Lahr, Abendrath, and Kane cases, for, in those cases,
the main questions in issue were those referring to the
property rights of the plaintiffs.
Since the decision of the Story case, the court, while
in no manner detracting from the authority of that de-
cision, has shown a constant inclination to restrain and
limit, that, and the subsequent decisions based upon it,
within definite bounds. And, while upholding in every
case, the theory that the abuitters' interests in the
streets constituted property, the rule of damages a-
doptcd and the rules as o eVidence admissable, are,
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for all practical purposes, limitations upon the effect
of the Story decision.
In the Bohm case, which represents the latest ex-
pression of opinion of the court of last resort, upon
the question of the nature of the abutters' property
interests in light, air and access, the decision is
based upon reasoning, which would seem to show that
that court is taking judicial notice of the nature of
the service which the Elevated Railroad Companies,
in New York, are rendering to that city.
Thai a man may have property rights in a street, and,
uhat these may be taken b-,. a railroad company without
any thing else than nominal damages being awarded to
him theoretically, seems anomalous. But, taking into
consideration the fact that these rights were,at first,
merely consequential rights, .hich, by the Story case,
were r'aised to the dignity of property interests, it
can be readily seen why no "abstiact" method of reasoning
would be permitted in determining their value.
There can be but little doubt that the Co *rt of
Appeals has gone as far, in deciding in favor of the
abutting owners, as it intends to go. And, there can
be scarsely less doubt, that, in reaching the conclu-
sions it has, it has been influenced, not so much by
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the strictly theoretical aspect of the situation, as,
by the mapnitude of lhe interests invblved, not alone
as represented by the interests of proj~erty owners,
but also by the great outlay and expenditure, which has
been made by the companies, in affording, or attempt-
ing to afford, means of rapid transit over the vas ,
area of the metropolis.

